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MERS: The Unreported Effects of Lost Chain 
of Title on Real Property Owners 
David E. Woolley* and Lisa D. Herzog** 
I. INTRODUCTION
Many problems with the Mortgage Electronic Registry System 
(“MERS”) and the home loan securitization process have been reported in 
print media, in movies, on television and in academic journals.  MERS now 
keeps electronic records on about half of the home mortgages in the United 
States.1  Courts have ruled against MERS’ standing to foreclose and have 
criticized the MERS model as being flawed, wholly inaccurate and not 
allowing homeowners to fight foreclosures because it shields the true 
owner of a mortgage in public records.2  States Attorneys’ General and 
* David E. Woolley is the principal, owner and founder of both Harbinger Analytics Group and D.
Woolley & Associates.  Mr. Woolley is a California Licensed Land Surveyor and Certified Fraud 
Examiner with over twenty-four years of experience.  At Harbinger Analytics, Mr. Woolley specializes 
in the investigation of commercial real property boundary disputes, land survey fraud, land title 
insurance fraud and their cumulative effects on mortgage loans.  Mr. Woolley is also an experienced 
expert witness, testifying in California and federal courts in a variety of land title, boundary dispute, and 
other civil litigation matters. 
At Harbinger Analytics, Mr. Woolley provides land title survey auditing and quality control 
programming, fraud investigation, and technical report production pertaining to land survey and land 
title fraud.  Harbinger Analytics Group also provides litigation support services in the form of expert 
witness opinions regarding standard of care, professional negligence, negligent misrepresentation and 
breach of representations and warranties. 
** Lisa D. Herzog is a California Licensed Attorney with over fourteen years of professional legal 
experience in the fields of business and real property litigation, employment litigation, discrimination 
litigation, and business transactions and agreements.  Ms. Herzog is an adjunct professor for Pepperdine 
University Graziadio School of Business and Management in Malibu, California.  She received a B.A. 
in Communcations and Psychology from Michigan State Unversity, a Masters in Labor and Industrial 
Relations from Michigan State University, and her J.D. from Pepperdine University School of Law. 
Ms. Herzog also serves as a writer, researcher, and editor for Harbinger Analytics Group where 
she specializes in preparing papers for publication.  She assists David Woolley in compiling client 
reports and findings. 
1. Marian Wang, Backgrounder: A Closer Look at MERS, the Industry’s Controversial Mortgage
Clearinghouse, PROPUBLICA (March 7, 2011), http://www.propublica.org/blog/item/backgrounder-a-
closer-look-at-mers-the-industrys-controversial-mortgage-cle. 
2. See In re Agard, 444 B.R. 231 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that MERS lacked the legal
standing to transfer the ownership of mortgages on behalf of banks).  In his opinion, Judge Robert E. 
Grossman stated “This court does not accept the argument that because MERS may be involved with 
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federal bank regulators3 are investigating MERS practices including 
fraudulently robo-signing (by way of servicers) and backdating missing 
documents.  A few County Registrars of Deeds are claiming that they are 
owed millions of dollars in lost revenue from mortgage assignment 
transfers that were not recorded because MERS was listed as the mortgagee 
in public land records.4 
What none of these “experts,” reporters, or courts are analyzing (in 
specific terms) is the destructive effect that the MERS system will have on 
400 years of recorded property rights in the United States.  Most articles 
mention the lost chain of title but stop short of explaining what this means, 
or how it will affect homeowners with or without mortgages in the MERS 
system.  These problems deal with ramifications “on the ground” (literally) 
for determining (1) property boundaries (senior and junior property rights) 
and (2) proof of ownership in order to obtain title insurance and financing. 
Most individuals reasonably assume the limits of their title agree with those 
delineated by improvements (i.e., fences), however, this may not be true. 
Because MERS is utilized for transferring title and these transfers are 
not publicly recorded (thereby imparting constructive notice), MERS does 
not comply with race (first in time) or (constructive or actual) notice5 
statutes and, therefore, senior/junior property rights cannot be determined 
when a discrepancy arises in property boundaries lines.  Consider the 
following: 
 What happens if the chain of title cannot be determined because
there are no accurate and publicly recorded deeds/title documents
showing chain of title to determine senior and junior rights 
designations for boundary determinations between neighbors? 
 What happens when you destroy the adjoining property rights and
records of homeowners who never defaulted on their mortgages
fifty percent of all residential mortgages in the country, that is reason enough for this court to turn a 
blind eye to the fact that this process does not comply with the law.” 
3. Including the Office of the Comptroller of Currency, the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation and the Federal Housing Finance Agency. Wang, supra note 1.  See also Nick 
Timiraos, Critical Signs in Foreclosure Talks, WALL STREET J., Apr. 12, 2011 (giving status of 
settlement with states’ attorneys general, and federal regulators and lenders). 
4. See Austin Kilgore, Recorder Wants to Close Account at Bank of America to Protest MERS,
NATIONAL MORTGAGE NEWS, (April 11, 2011), at 8, available at http://www.nationalmortgagenews. 
com/on_features/recorder-wants-to-close-bofa-account-1024417-1.html?site=default_tech (regarding 
Registrar of Deeds in South Essex District of Massachusetts).  “MERS saved banks time and money by 
providing a private, electronic alternative to the public system used by local government recorders.  By 
using the MERS registry, they largely avoided the recording fees.”  Wang, supra note 1. 
5. For the purposes of this article, no distinction is made between race, notice, and race/notice.
Race/notice is meant to encompass all designations. 
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are now forced to litigate boundary disputes and property rights? 
 Why did the title insurance companies repeatedly refuse to
underwrite foreclosures if land title was stable?6
These are the exact problems that MERS has created—the bigger 
problems that no one has explained—the elephant in the room.  Thanks to 
MERS’ failure to accurately complete and/or publically record property 
conveyances in the frenzy of banks securitizing home loans and in 
subsequent foreclosure actions,7 neighbors to a foreclosed property (with a 
sequential conveyance8) as well as the foreclosed property itself will have 
unclear boundaries on the ground and clouded/unmarketable titles making 
it difficult, if not impossible, for these homeowners to sell their properties 
and for subsequent purchasers to obtain title insurance and financing on 
that property.  We will not be able to determine senior (superior) and junior 
(inferior) property rights designations because no one will know which 
parcels were conveyed first in time and to whom. 
The MERS system has created an environment in which tens of 
thousands of titles have been lost or diluted in a sea of MERS transactions 
and may take a hundred years to fix, while forcing innocent adjacent 
homeowners to litigate in order to reclaim their property rights.  This article 
will: (1) summarize the history of how land was surveyed and divided in 
the Western United States, (2) explain how junior and senior property 
rights are determined in the face of a boundary dispute, (3) briefly discuss 
the robo-signer scandal, the problem with the MERS system and recent 
court cases involving MERS, (4) describe exactly how MERS has 
destroyed or severely diluted chains of title for boundary disputes between 
foreclosed properties’ subsequent owners and all of their neighbors, (5) 
6. At one point in October 2010, Old Republic was reportedly refusing to write title policies for
some foreclosures altogether.  Stephanie Armour, Old Republic To Stop Writing Policies For Some 
Foreclosures, USA TODAY, October 2, 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/housing/2010-
10-02-old-republic-foreclosures_N.htm.
7. “For banks, the local government recorders weren’t speedy enough especially as the mortgage
industry moved into the business of securitization, or bundling and selling mortgages.” Wang, supra 
note 1. 
8. A sequential conveyance occurs when: 
a portion of a tract of land is sold, two or more parcels are created, a new parcel and the
remainder parent parcel.  Because the new parcel must receive all of the land described, it is
called the senior deed, and the remainder, at the time of conveyance, becomes the junior
deed.  Sequential conveyances are those written deeds in which junior and senior rights exist
between two adjoining parcels.  In general, sequential conveyances came into being because
of a lapse of time between successive conveyance instruments. 
BROWN, CURTIS M., WALTER G. ROBILLARD, DONALD A. WILSON, BROWN’S BOUNDARY CONTROL 
AND LEGAL PRINCIPLES § 11.2 (6th ed. 2009). 
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analyze the resulting difficulty these subsequent homeowners and their 
neighbors will experience when attempting to sell their properties (with 
clouded titles) when purchasers will not be able to obtain title insurance 
(without seller indemnity) and financing. 
II. LAND DIVISION AND CHAIN OF TITLE IN THE
UNITED STATES 
A. A BRIEF HISTORY LESSON
The concept of land title is uniquely American.  Historically, Native
Americans had no concept of written title because they did not believe that 
any person could “own” land.  European settlers changed this belief by 
imposing the concept of land ownership by individual people on the New 
World of America.9  Today, the concept of stable individual “land 
ownership” separates America from most of the rest of the world.  In the 
United States, the following key concepts are true: (1) real property law 
rights and defenses all tie to accurate and publically recorded chain of title 
and property ownership records at the county level, (2) accurate publically 
recorded chain of title documents are critical in determining land 
ownership (senior and junior property rights) avoiding the need for 
litigation, (3) there are no federal laws governing private property rights. 
Therefore, a federal system of title (electronic or otherwise) is not feasible, 
(4) the stability of the land title is paramount in preserving land ownership
and maintaining civil harmony, and (5) real property is a secure and
valuable investment.
In the Western States, land division began with the Louisiana 
Purchase of 1803. According to this statute and pursuant to the Land Act of 
1805, land was to be surveyed west of the Mississippi River all the way to 
California (excluding Texas at that time).10  Government Land Office 
(“GLO”) surveyors, beginning in Ohio, were tasked with subdividing land 
into one square mile sections—each containing 640 acres.11  Nevertheless, 
no two parcels are exactly the same when measured on the ground due to 
rough terrain, bad weather, and antiquated instruments and, sometimes, 
surveyors’ failure to survey at all.  These subdivided 640 acres varied from 
a few inches to several hundred feet.  Like snowflakes, each 640-acre 
section was different and these discrepancies remain today. 
As early as 1891, the California legislature recognized that land 
9. BROWN, ROBILLARD, AND WILSON, supra note 8, at § 1.2. 
10. Id. at § 6.
11. Id. 
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subdivided by way of a written description was prone to title defects, gaps, 
gores and overlaps which resulted in expensive litigation.  At that time, 
California (and most other states) enacted laws that required a land 
surveyor to file a public record each time one of these property lines was 
established by a surveyor.  These laws were intended to make the property 
line determinations available to the public, thus avoiding litigation to 
resolve disputes associated with unfiled records or unclear boundaries. 
Modern day surveyors are still discovering discrepancies in the course 
of conducting boundary surveys; therefore, it is easy to see why material 
discrepancies in title still arise.  The only way to resolve these boundary 
discrepancies, absent litigation, is by examination of the chain of title to 
determine senior and junior property rights and divide the land according to 
established legal principles. 
B. THE SURVEYOR’S ROLE – DETERMINING SENIOR AND JUNIOR
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SEQUENTIAL PROPERTY CONVEYANCES
As a practical matter, the law (and surveyors) deals with boundary 
discrepancies discovered by surveys, without the need for litigation, by 
examining the chain of title (found in publically recorded documents and 
grantor/grantee indexes) back to the original owner and grantor to 
determine senior and junior rights for sequential conveyances.  The real 
property’s history of conveyances from one owner to another is called a 
“chain of title.”  Chain of title is specifically defined as the “record of 
successive conveyances, or other forms of alienation, affecting a particular 
parcel of land, arranged consecutively, from the government or original 
source of title down to the present holder.”12 
Because only evidence of ownership is recorded in these public 
records, to prove ownership of a particular parcel, a property owner must 
show a continuous title record back to the first conveyance by the original 
owner/grantor that described the parcel.  The compilation of all title 
ownership is known as the chain of title or chain of record.13  When a 
portion of a tract of land is sold, two or more parcels are created including 
a “new parcel” and the “remainder” of the parent parcel.14  A parcel is 
apportioned according to well-settled principles found in race/notice 
statutes.  Because the “new parcel” must receive all the land described, it is 
called the “senior deed” (or “senior parcel”, “senior rights”) and at the time 
of conveyance the “remainder” becomes the “junior deed” (or “junior 
12. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 229 (6th ed. 1990). 
13. BROWN, ROBILLARD, AND WILSON, supra note 8, at 457. 
14. Id. at 301.
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parcel,” “junior rights”).15  “Sequential conveyances” are those written 
deeds in which junior and senior rights exist between adjoining parcels.16 
Stated another way, the first (in time) conveyance by deed is called the 
senior conveyance.  The next (in time) conveyance by deed is called the 
junior conveyance.  Four well established principles in law and in 
surveying that determine senior and junior property rights are stated as 
follows: 
(1) “As between private parties in a land dispute, a senior right is
superior to a junior right;”17 
(2) “As between private parties, a junior grant, in conflict with a
senior grant, yields to the senior grant;”18 
(3) A grantor cannot convey what he does not own;19 and
(4) Between equal equities, the first in order of time shall prevail.20
These principals establish the rights of the parties when excesses or,
more importantly, when deficiencies in the amount of land conveyed to two 
parties occurs.  The surveyor (and the courts) study the chain of title from 
recorded public deeds/title documents to determine senior and junior rights 
designations based on the portion of the parcel that was conveyed first in 
time (pursuant to race/notice statutes) by the original grantor.  Based on 
existing case law and statutory authority, this boundary determination is 
made clearly and accurately without the need for litigation as to the 
location of the property lines. 
Diagram A on the following page shows the importance of a clear 
chain of title. 
15. BROWN, ROBILLARD, AND WILSON, supra note 8, at 301. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. at 297.
18. Id. at 303.
19. Caselli v. Messina, 567 N.Y.S.2d 972, 973-74 (App. Div. 1990). 
20. Maxims of Equity, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maxims_of_equity (last updated
Dec. 5, 2011) (citing Richard Edwards, Nigel Stockwell (Pearson Education, 2005) Trusts and Equity, 
pg. 34). 
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Diagram A 
Normal Conveyance (Non-MERS) 
A believes he 
owns 100 feet 
but he really 
owns 95 feet. 
A conveys East 
50 feet to B in 
1960.  Sale is 
recorded and 
traceable in 
grantor/grantee 
index. 
A  
Remainder 
B 
East 50 feet 
(1960) 
A conveys West 
50 feet to C in 
1970 (but A only 
has 45 feet left to 
convey).  C thinks 
he owns West 50 
feet.  The 
conveyance from 
A to C is recorded 
and traceable in 
grantor/grantee 
index. 
B and C get 
into 
boundary 
dispute and 
have survey 
done that 
determines 
original 
parcel 
owned by A 
was only 95 
feet, not 100 
feet. 
C 
Remainder 
(1970) 
B 
East 50 feet 
(1960) 
Original 
Grantor A 
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1. B and C now have a problem.  How is A’s original parcel divided?
2. The division between B and C is determined by examining the
chain of title (found in the publicly recorded documents and the
grantor/grantee indexes) back the original grantor A.
3. B acquired the East 50 feet from A in 1960 leaving A with 45 feet.
4. C acquired the West 50 feet from A in 1970, however, A only had
45 feet left to convey.
5. Because B acquired his 50 feet first in time (superior) he keeps 50
feet and C keeps the remaining 45 feet (junior).
6. C’s deed is reformed to reflect 45 feet and this document is
recorded.
This basic example shows the importance of a clear chain of title in 
determining property rights in sequential conveyances, particularly when 
dealing with a previously flawed survey or an ambiguous conveyance.  In 
the event that the chain of title cannot be recovered, owners will be forced 
to litigate boundaries because they will not be able to determine the senior 
rights—the exact problem created by MERS.  See Diagram B below. 
III. ROBO-SIGNER MORTGAGE FRAUD
One year ago, the American public was unfamiliar with the term 
“robo-signer” describing loan processors and attorneys signing as many as 
10,000 foreclosure documents a month (like robots) without reviewing the 
documents’ contents.21 Many lenders, including Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac, turned to law firms (“foreclosure mills”) that specialized in quick 
processing of thousands of foreclosures for banks.22  A foreclosure mill is 
created in the following scenario: 
A loan is securitized through MERS (wherein MERS is presumably 
the mortgagee holding land title and is also named as the nominee by the 
promissory note holder).  At this point, the promissory note and the 
mortgage are separated.  The promissory note is then pooled with other 
21. Ariana Eunjung Cha & Brady Dennis, Under Piles of Paperwork, a Foreclosure System in
Chaos, WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 23, 2010, http/www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 
2010/09/22/AR2010092206146.html. 
22. Stephanie Armour & Thomas Frank, Ex-worker: Florida Law Firm Ran “Foreclosure Mill”, 
USA TODAY, Oct. 18, 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/housing/2010-10-18-witness-
foreclosure-documents_N.html. 
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promissory notes, repackaged, resold and haphazardly tracked (or not 
tracked at all) through the private MERS system.  Nevertheless, this 
promissory note is not publically recorded and oftentimes is lost or 
misplaced.  Subsequently, when a property goes into default, the 
foreclosing party must prove ownership (conveying standing) to foreclose. 
This becomes a problem.  The last promissory note assignee, (who may or 
may not possess the promissory note) claims ownership.  Meanwhile, the 
land title mortgage may be held by MERS. 23 
Banks have subsequently argued, with limited success, that even 
though separated, the mortgage actually follows the note.  It is the marriage 
of the promissory note (often times lost or nonexistent) and the mortgage 
(after lost or nonexistent assignments) that was the incentive for robo-
signer fraud.  Using robo-signers to falsify and recreate these previously 
lost or nonexistent documents was the remedy created by the servicers—
resulting in fraud, forgery and falsification of legal documents.  The irony 
of the foreclosure mills and robo-signers is that at any given bank, front 
line bank teller requires multiple forms of identification, thumb prints and 
signature verifications in order for a customer to cash a check while the 
same banks use robo-signers to create tens of thousands of forgeries (or 
their latest preferred term of “surrogate signatures”).24 
This conduct at foreclosure mills reached fraudulent levels and caused 
the fifty states attorneys general to convene a committee (headed by Tom 
Miller, Attorney General of Iowa) to investigate this fraudulent activity by 
mortgage servicers.25  Bank executives and states’ attorneys general came 
up with initial settlement terms in March, 2011 with a price tag of $20 
billion and wide ranging releases of liability.26  Preliminary agreement 
terms for any settlement between the attorneys general and large banks 
have been deeply criticized.27  New York Attorney General Eric T. 
Schneiderman is one of a hand full of attorneys general not willing to 
23. See Diagram B infra. 
24. Christine Stapleton, Surrogate Signers Signed Countless Foreclosure Documents With
Someone Else’s Name, WALL STREET MAIN STREET (Apr. 1, 2011), http://www.wallstreetmainstreet. 
com/2011/04/surrogate-signers-signed-countless.html. 
25. Lorraine Woellert, Dakin Campbell & Carter Dougherty, Mortgage Servicers Said To Agree to
Fix Foreclosure Procedures, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 5, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-04-
05/mortgage-servicers-said-to-agree-to-fix-foreclosure-procedures.html.  See also Dave Clarke, Update 
1 – Iowa AG Looks To Foreclosure Deal Within 2 Months, REUTERS (Mar. 7, 2011), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/07/financial-regulation-servicing-idUSN0712043720110307. 
26. Gretchen Morgenson, The Banks Still Want a Waiver, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2011, 
www.nytimes.com/2011/07/24/business/bank-settlement-in-mortgage-mess-may-hinge-on-mers.html. 
27. Gretchen Morgenson, Attorney General of N.Y. Is Said to Face Pressure on Bank Foreclosure
Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2011, www.nytimes.com/2011/08/22/business/schneiderman-is-said-to-
face-pressure-to-back-bank-deal.html?pagewanted=all. 
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support the proposed settlement.28  Nevertheless, high level government 
officials have pressured Schneiderman to agree to the proposed 
settlement.29  Most recently, when Schneiderman refused to fall in line, he 
was kicked off of the fifty-state task force.30  Subsequently, John O’Brien, 
Registry of Deeds for Southern Essex County, Massachusetts, and an 
outspoken opponent of MERS, called for Tom Miller to step down as task 
force chairperson.31 
Massachusetts Attorney General Martha Coakley stated that she 
would not sign on to any deal that would release the banks from liability 
for MERS practices and Attorneys General from Delaware, Minnesota, 
Kentucky and Nevada joined New York’s Scheiderman in believing that 
the negotiations were absolving banks of too much liability.32 
More recently, California’s Attorney General Kamala Harris broke 
away from the fifty state mortgage settlement.33  Looming issues regarding 
any settlement between the attorneys general committee and banks relate to 
potential liability stemming from MERS.34  Harris stated that she pulled out 
of the talks because the pending deal was “inadequate for California 
homeowners” and gives bank officials too much legal immunity.35  The 
departure of California (a large state in terms of population, foreclosure 
exposure and electoral college) along with the other states that have 
abandoned the settlement talks means that any settlement between 
remaining states has limited practical meaning or credibility.36  David 
Pelligrinelli, president of AFX Title, a title research company, stated that 
MERS contributed to the problem of thousands of mortgages lacking a 
28. Morgenson, supra note 27.
29. Id.
30. Richard Zombeck, John O’Brien MA Registry of Deeds: AG Tom Miller Should Step Down, 
HUFFINGTON POST, Sept. 2, 2011, www.huffingtonpost.com/richard-zombeck/john-obrien-ma-registry-
o_b_935417.html. 
31. Id. 
32. Jon Prior, Iowa AG: Banks May Face Criminal Liability After Robo-Signing Settlement,
HOUSINGWIRE.COM (Sept. 2, 2011), www.housingwire.com/2011/09/02/iowa-ag-banks-may-face-
criminal-liability-after-robo-signing-settlement.  See also Letter from Lori Swanson, Attorney General 
of Minnesota, to Tom Miller, Iowa Attorney General, (Sept. 9, 2011) available at http://static1. 
firedoglake.com/37/files/2011/09/Document.pdf (stating that any settlement between government 
regulators and the mortgage industry should have “teeth” and hold “banks accountable for their 
wrongful conduct, enjoining future unlawful activity, and helping injured homeowners”).  See also 
Yves Smith, Game Over: California Attorney General Breaks From “50 State” Mortgage Settlement, 
NAKED CAPITALISM (Sept. 30, 2011), www.nakedcapitalism.com/2011/09/california-attorney-general-
breaks-from-50-state-mortgage-settlement.html. 
33. Smith, supra note 32. 
34. Morgenson, supra note 27. 
35. Smith, supra note 32.  See also Matt Taibibi, The Next Big Bank Bailout, ROLLING STONE
(Oct. 5, 2011), www.rollingstone.com/politics/blogs/taibblog/attorneys-general-settlement-the-next-big-
bank-bailout-20111005. 
36. Smith, supra note 32. 
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complete ownership chain.37  According to Pelligrinelli “[y]ou can’t go back 
and re-document these things, because some of the companies aren’t around 
anymore.  Even if they are, the charters for these companies don’t allow for 
backdating of assignments.”38 
Lawyers who have examined this issue state that it would be 
unprecedented to grant a broad release from liability to banks that own 
MERS from claims that have not been investigated.39  Furthermore, a broad 
release of liability would vastly diminish the possibility of an in-depth 
investigation of MERS and might also make it harder for borrowers to 
argue that MERS had no right, or standing, to foreclose on them.40 
New York Attorney General Eric T. Schneiderman is also moving to 
block a proposed $8.5 billion settlement struck in June, 2011 by Bank of 
New York Mellon and Bank of America over troubled loan pools issued by 
Countrywide.41  Attorney General Schneiderman filed suit against Bank of 
New York for fraud in its role as trustee overseeing pools of investors.42  
Additionally, the Office of the Comptroller of Currency, the Federal 
Reserve, the Office of Thrift Supervision and the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation are negotiating with the largest U.S. mortgage servicers and 
signing consent decrees to improve foreclosure procedures.43 
The Federal Reserve recently requested that Bank of America buy 
back (known as “put backs”) residential mortgage backed securities 
(“RMBS”), exclusive of the commercial mortgage market, totaling $47 
billion.44  These securities were called into question when authorities 
discovered the robo-signer problem.  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
requested that Bank of America buy back RMBS totaling $5.6 billion in 
June 2010.45  Bank of America, in turn, sued the FDIC for $1.75 billion for 
37. Morgenson, supra note 26. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
41. Gretchen Morgenson, Mortgage Settlement Changed, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/05/business/new-york-moves-to-block-mortgage-settlement.html. See 
also Yves Smith, New York Attorney General Schneiderman Drops Bomb on Bank of America 
Settlement and Bank of New York, NAKED CAPITALISM (Aug. 5, 2011), http://www.nakedcapitalism. 
com/2011/08/new-york-attorney-general-schneiderman-drops-bomb-on-bank-of-america-settlement-an 
d-bank-of-new-york.html.
42. Id. 
43. Lorraine Woellert, Dakin Campbell and Carter Dougherty, Mortgage Servicers Said To Agree
to Fix Foreclosure Procedures, BLOOMBERG, (Apr. 5, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-
04-05/mortgage-servicers-said-to-agree-to-fix-foreclosure-procedures.html.
44. “Securitization” refers to mortgage loans pooled into trusts and converted into mortgage-
backed securities that can be bought and sold by investors.  U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Ibanez, 941 
N.E.2d 40, 46 (2011). 
45. Bank of America Corp. Has $11.1 Billion In Mortgage Purchase Requests, AMERICAN
BANKING AND MARKET NEWS (Aug. 9, 2010). http://www.americanbankingnews.com/2010/08/09/ 
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“putbacks”.46  Bank of America has also sued First American Title claiming 
that First American has refused to cover more than 5,500 loans that have 
caused $535 million in losses.47  In August 2011, insurer AIG filed a $10- 
billion suit against Bank of America, accusing them and their Countrywide 
Financial and Merrill Lynch units of misrepresenting the quality of 
mortgages that backed the securities purchased by AIG.48  The SEC 
charged Citigroup’s principal U.S. broker dealer subsidiary with 
misleading investors about a $1-billion collateralized debt obligation 
(“CDO”) tied to the U.S. housing market in which Citigroup bet against 
investors as the housing market showed signs of distress.49  After the CDO 
defaulted, investors were left with losses while Citigroup made $160 
million in fees and trading profits.50  Citigroup agreed to settle the SEC’s 
charges (without admitting liability) on October 19, 2011, for $285 million 
to be returned to investors.51 
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) is warning that 
flaws may have infected millions of foreclosures and questioning whether 
other regulators’ inquiries into problems at the U.S. mortgage-servicing 
companies have been sufficiently thorough.52  Most recently, the Federal 
Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”) that oversees the mortgage giants 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is set to file lawsuits, seeking billions of 
dollars in compensation, against more than a dozen big banks (including 
Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, Goldman Sachs, and Deutsche Bank), 
accusing them of misrepresenting the quality of mortgage securities they 
assembled and sold at the top of the mortgage bubble.53  The suits will 
argue that banks, which assembled the mortgages and marketed them as 
securities to investors, failed to perform the due diligence required under 
securities law, and overlooked evidence that borrowers incomes were 
bank-of-america-corp-nyse-bac-has-11-1-billion-in-mortgage-purchase-requests/#. 
46. Karen Gullo, FDIC Sued By Bank of America Over Taylor Bean Mortgage Losses,
BLOOMBERG, (Oct. 19, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-20/bank-of-america-sues-
fdic-over-taylor-bean-mortgage-s-1-75-billion-losses.html. 
47. David Mildenberg, Bank of America Sues First American on Lien Protection Claims,
BLOOMBERG, (Feb. 22, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-20/bank-of-america-sues-
fdic-over-taylor-bean-mortgage-s-1-75-billion-losses.html. 
48. Nelson D. Schwartz, U.S. Is Set to Sue a Dozen Big Banks Over Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
1, 2011, at A1. 
49. Press Release, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Citigroup to Pay $285 Million to
Settle SEC Charges for Misleading Investors About CDO Tied to Housing Market (Oct. 19, 2011), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-214.htm. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
52. Alan Zibel, FDIC’s Bair:  Millions of Foreclosures Could Be ‘Infected’, WALL ST. J., May 12,
2011, http://blogs.wsj.com/developments/2011/05/12/fdics-bair-millions-of-foreclosures-could-be-infected. 
53. Nelson D. Schwartz, U.S. Is Set to Sue a Dozen Big Banks Over Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1,
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/02/business/us-is-set-to-sue-dozen-big-banks-over-mort gages. html. 
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inflated or falsified.54  When borrowers were unable to pay their mortgages, 
the securities backed by the mortgages quickly lost value.55  Fannie and 
Freddie lost more than $30 billion, in part as a result of these deals, and the 
subsequent losses were mostly passed on to taxpayers.56 
In 2008, the Housing and Economic Recovery Act (“HERA”) 
established the Federal Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”) as a supervisor 
and regulator of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.57  Through its investigation 
in 2010, the FHFA recommended that it review the circumstances 
surrounding FHFA’s failure to identify foreclosure abuses by the retained 
attorney network used by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, develop 
procedures for default related legal services and develop and implement 
policies and procedures to address poor performance by default-related 
legal services vendors.58 
Furthermore, according to a Reuters investigation (as reported by the 
Huffington Post), despite these actions by elected officials and 
governmental regulators, mortgage lenders are continuing to take the same 
shortcuts, from sketchy paperwork to the use of robo-signers.59  Reuters 
found that some of the biggest U.S. banks and other loan servicers continue 
to file questionable foreclosure documents with courts and county clerks 
using the same tactics that triggered an outcry, multiple investigations and 
temporary moratoriums on foreclosures.60  In recent months, servicers have 
filed thousands of documents that appear to have been fabricated or 
improperly altered, or have sworn to false facts.61  Reuters also identified at 
least six “robo-signers” who have each recently falsely signed thousands of 
mortgage assignments.62  A similar Associated Press article published in 
November 2011 revealed that, in investigations in July of the same year, 
servicers were continuing to generate documents signed by well-known 
robo-signers, including the notorious “Linda Greene”.63  According to the  
54. Schwartz, supra note 53. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, FED HOUSING FIN. AGENCY, FHFA’S OVERSIGHT OF FANNIE 
MAE’S DEFAULT-RELATED LEGAL SERVICES, 8 (Sept. 30, 2011), http://www.fhfaoig.gov/Content/Files/ 
AUD-2011-004.pdf. 
58. Id. at 16–17. 
59. Scot J. Paltrow, Banks Continue ‘Robo-Signing’ Foreclosure Practices In Spite Of Promises
To Contrary: Investigation, REUTERS (July 18, 2011, 7:39 PM) http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/ 
07/18/foreclosure-banks-idUSL3E7II1UC20110718. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. Yves Smith, Bank CEOs Lying When They Say They’ve Stopped Robosigning, NAKED 
CAPITALISM  (Nov. 4, 2011), http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2011/11/banks-lying-when-they-say-
theyve-stopped-robosiging.html. 
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April 2011 60 Minutes piece, “Linda Greene” was supposedly a vice 
president at twenty different banks at the same time.64 
Additionally, Nevada Attorney General Catherine Cortez Mastro 
recently filed a 606 count indictment against two title officers of Lender 
Processing Services (“LPS”) in Clark County, Nevada for supervising and 
filing tens of thousands of documents in a robo-signing scheme.65  Many of 
these charges were category C and D felonies.66  A Nevada grand jury 
subsequently indicted two LPS employees on alleged robo-signing of 
foreclosure documents.67 
Gone are the days of the S&L bailouts ultimately resulting in a net 
loss to tax payers of approximately $124 billion by the end of 1999.68 
Ironically, some of the same players are involved again.  Now, some of the 
former Keating Five (still in public service) can advise our current 
government how to wade through the MERS fiasco.  Banks, originators and 
servicers are Lucy and the American taxpayer is Charlie Brown. 
IV. THE MERS SYSTEM
A. WHAT IS MERS?
MERS is a corporation registered in Delaware and headquartered in
the Virginia suburbs of Washington, D.C.69 that operates a computer 
database designed to track servicing and ownership rights of mortgage 
loans anywhere in the United States.70  Originators and secondary market 
players pay inexpensive membership dues and per-transaction fees to 
MERS in exchange for the right to use and access MERS’ records.71  In 
64. Chris Kirkham, Sarah Palin’s Arizona Home Purchase Clouded By Foreclosure Fraud,
Analysis Finds, HUFFINGTON POST (June 10, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/10/sarah-
palin-arizona-home-foreclosure fraud_n_875186.html. 
65. Yves Smith, Nevada Attorney General Mastro Files 606 Count Criminal Indictment Against
Two Title Officers (Updated: Lender Processing Services Employees), NAKED CAPITALISM (Nov. 16, 
2011), http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2011/11/nevada-attorney-general-mamsto-files-606-count-cri 
minal-indictment-against-two-title-officers.html. 
66. Id. 
67. Andrew Scoggin, Nevada Grand Jury Indicts 2 LPS Workers On Robo-Signing Charges, 
HOUSING WIRE, (Nov. 16, 2011), http://www.housingwire.com/2011/11/16/nevada-grand-jury-indicts-
2-on-robo-signing-charges.
68.  Timothy Curry & Lynn Shibut, The Cost of the Savings and Loan Crisis: Truth and
Consequences, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 13 FDIC BANKING REV. 26, 33 (2000), 
available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/banking/2000dec/brv13n2_2.pdf. 
69. Carson Mullen, MERS: Tracking Loans Electronically, MORTGAGE BANKING 63 (May 31,
2000) http://www.allbusiness.com/finance/3594162-1.html. 
70. Howard Schneider, MERS Aids Electronic Mortgage Program, MORTGAGE BANKING 42 (Jan.
1, 1997) http://www.allbusiness.com/finance/608126-1.html. 
71. Schneider, supra note 70. 
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addition to tracking ownership and servicing rights, when closing on home 
mortgages, many mortgage lenders now list MERS as the “mortgagee of 
record” on the paper mortgage rather than the actual mortgagee.72  MERS 
was designed to improve the efficiency and profitability of the primary and 
secondary mortgage markets.73  The benefit of naming MERS as the 
nominal mortgagee of record is that when the member transfers an interest 
in the mortgage loan to another MERS member, MERS may (or may not) 
privately track the assignment within its system, however, MERS remains 
the mortgagee of record in publicly recorded documents.74  In 2011, MERS 
proposed a rule change to stop members from foreclosing in its name.75 
B. MERS CONNECTION TO SUB-PRIME LOANS AND SECURITIZATION
Before 1995, typically a qualified home buyer applied for a mortgage
loan (whole-loan) with his/her local bank, credit union or savings and 
loan.76  The credit-worthy borrower agreed to make payments until the 
mortgage debt was paid in full.  Around 1995, a new breed of loan came 
into play—the sub-prime loan.  These loans (often times for one hundred 
percent or more of the market value of the residential property and no 
longer dependent upon a borrower’s credit worthiness) changed the 
landscape of mortgage banking, leading, in part, to the current foreclosure 
crisis.  These loans were created and supported by lawmakers.  For 
example, according to Congresswoman Maxine Waters: 
[U]nder the outstanding leadership of Mr. Frank Raines everything in
the 1992 act has worked just fine.  In fact, the GSE’s [Fannie and
Freddie] have exceeded their housing goals.  What we need to do today
is to focus on the regulator, and this must be done in a manner so as not
to impede their affordable housing mission, a mission that has seen
innovation flourish from desktop underwriting to 100 percent loans.77
Knowing that their borrowers were not credit worthy and that the
borrowers’ home mortgages would almost certainly end in default, 
72. R.K. Arnold, Yes, There Is Life On MERS, 11 PROB. & PROP. 16, 32–34 (1997). 
73. John R. Hooge & Laurie Williams, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.: A Survey
of Cases Discussing MERS Authority To Act, NORTON BANKR.LAW ADVISOR, Aug. 2010, at 2. 
74. Id. 
75. Laura Marcinek, BofA, Citigroup Say Mortgage Database Draws Scrutiny In Foreclosure
Probe, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 2, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-03-02/bofa-citigroup-
pnc-say-mers-mortgage-database-draws-probes.html. 
76. Scot Paltrow & Leslie Adler (editor), Factbox: The Role of MERS In Foreclosure Furor, 
REUTERS (Oct. 13, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/10/13/us-usa-foreclosures-mers-idUS 
TRE69C69720101013. 
77. The Secondary Mortgage Market Enterprises Regulatory Improvement Act: Hearing on H.R.
2575 Before the H. Comm. On Fin. Serv. U.S. H.R., 108th  Cong. 9 (2003) (statement of Rep. Maxine 
Waters), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-108hhrg92628/pdf/CHRG-108hhrg92628. 
pdf. (emphasis added). 
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mortgage lenders unloaded these loans as quickly as possible to large 
institutional banks.  These banks, in turn, bought and sold the loans 
amongst themselves and subsequently pooled them into trusts and then 
converted them into mortgage backed securities (also referred to as 
collateralized debt obligations (“CDOs”), meaning that the asset behind the 
paper is real property).  These CDOs were bought and sold by and to 
investors.78  Mortgage-backed securities were almost uniformly rated AAA 
or Aaa by Fitch, Moody’s and Standard & Poors.79  The AAA rating was 
appealing to risk adverse investors and these mortgage backed securities 
ended up in conservative pension funds such as CalPERS and conservative 
investment brokerage funds owned by companies such as MetLife, 
Blackrock, Inc. and Allstate.80 
In the midst of creating these trusts and mortgage-backed securities, 
MERS was created to shuffle these loans quickly between lenders, leaving 
homeowners unable to find out who actually owned their mortgage at any 
given time.81 
Mortgages would be changing hands dozens of times, going from loan 
originators to banks to Wall Street investment houses, which would 
collect them by the thousands and package them into complex debt 
instruments that would be chopped up into shares and sold off to 
multiple investors all over the world.82 
C. WHAT IS WRONG WITH MERS?
After the financial collapse of 2008, MERS began foreclosure actions
on behalf of lenders.83  The creation of MERS allowed mortgage companies 
to list MERS as the proxy for the true mortgage holder in local government 
records and to record subsequent changes of ownership in the MERS 
78. Yasha Levine, How an Obscure Outfit Called MERS Is Subverting Our Entire System of
Property Rights, ALTERNET (Dec. 16, 2010), http://www.alternet.org/economy/149189/dude,_where 
%27s_my_mortgage_how_an_obscure_outfit_called_mers_is_subverting_our_entire_system_of_prope
rty _rights/?page=entire. 
79. Peter Cohan, Behind the $4 Trillion in CDOs: Sneaky Banks and Worthless Ratings, DAILY 
FINANCE (Apr. 26, 2010, 10:45AM), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2010/04/26/explaining-the-4-
trillion-cdo-scam-worthless-ratings-hide-inve/ (also stating that ninety-three percent of the 2006 AAA 
ratings were later downgraded to junk). 
80. Allstate Sues BofA on MBS Purchase, ZACKS.COM (Dec. 30, 2010), http://www.zacks.com/
stock/news/45341/Allstate+Sues+BofA+on+MBS+Purchase (last visited Feb. 3, 2012). 
81. This lack of knowledge often led to payments made to the wrong bank or lender because the
homeowner could not look to publicly recorded deeds to determine the ever changing identity of their 
lender. Michael Grover, Fed-led Research Reveals Need for Better Twin Cities Foreclosure Data, 
COMMUNITY DIVIDEND (Sept. 1, 2006), http://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications_papers/pub_ 
display.cfm?id=2200. 
82. Levine, supra note 78.
83. Robbie Whelan, Lawmaker Questions Power To Foreclose, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 1, 2010), http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704865104575588791583567372.html. 
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system only.84  A spokeswoman for Fannie Mae told the New York Times 
that Fannie Mae could never rely on MERS to find ownership of a loan.85  
In 2010, Alan M. White (Law Professor at Valparaiso University Law 
School, Indiana) matched MERS ownership records against those in the 
public domain and found that fewer than thirty percent of the mortgages 
had accurate records in MERS.86  Robo-signed documents, inaccurate or 
non-existent record keeping, the failure to publically record assignments of 
mortgages and the use of MERS as the mortgagee or nominee have led to 
the homeowners’ inability to figure out who owns and services their 
mortgages or to trace back their chain of title.  In using the inaccurate and 
alleged to be fraudulent MERS system, banks are actually denying 
homeowners their due process rights before they lose their homes to 
foreclosure. 
Furthermore, because the MERS system allowed lenders to avoid the 
time and expense of going through the County Recorder’s office to file and 
record title documents, MERS also robs County Recorders of filing fees. 
In fact, various county recorders have begun to take action attempting to 
recoup some of these fees.  In Massachusetts, South Essex Register of 
Deeds John O’Brien reported that he had received a green light to withdraw 
what could be millions of dollars from Bank of America accounts by 
arguing that banks have used MERS to deny the South Essex registry 
millions of dollars in fees to which it was entitled.87  Dallas County District 
Attorney Craig Watkins filed a lawsuit (later turned into a class action) 
against MERS and Bank of America Corp. over unpaid filing fees.88  
Similarly, counties in Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio and Oklahoma have also 
sued MERS—all claiming that the MERS system has cheated them out of 
filing fees.89 
Some homeowners are arguing that MERS does not have a right to 
initiate foreclosure actions because MERS does not hold the title and the 
corresponding note to their properties.  These same homeowners are also 
84. Marian Wang, Backgrounder: A Closer Look at MERS, the Industry’s Controversial Mortgage
Clearinghouse, PROPUBLICA (Mar. 7, 2011, 4:53 PM), http://www.propublica.org/blog/item/back 
grounder-a-closer-look-at-mers-the-industrys-controversial-mortgage-cle (emphasis added). 
85. Wang, supra note 84. 
86. Id. 
87. Eric Convey, Deeds Head Gets OK To Yank BofA Funds, BOS. BUS. J. (April 6, 2011,
9:46AM),http://www.bizjournals.com/boston/news/2011/04/06/deeds-head-gets-ok-to-yank-bofafunds. 
html; see also Austin Kilgore, Recorder Wants To Close Account at Bank of America To Protest MERS, 
NAT’L MORTG. NEWS (Apr. 11, 2011, 11:20PM), http://www.nationalmortgagenews.com/on_features/ 
recorder-wants-to-close-bofa-account-1024417-1.html. 
88. Margaret Cronin Fisk, Dallas Revises MERS Filing-Fee Suit to Add All Texas Counties,
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 1, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-01/dallas-seeks-to-add-all-
texas-counties-to-mers-filing-fee-suit.html. 
89. Id. 
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arguing that the MERS system does not accurately show which lender 
holds the trust deed for title on the foreclosed property.  Furthermore, even 
if MERS forecloses a property for a lender (that does not actually have title 
and the corresponding note to the property), an argument could be made 
that the lender may be prohibited from reselling the property because the 
lender cannot sell that which it does not own.  According to recent court 
rulings, there may be no standing to foreclose without proof of title and the 
note, there may be no standing to foreclose.90  To foreclose on real 
property, the plaintiff must establish the chain of title entitling plaintiff to 
relief.91  MERS has acknowledged, and recent cases have held, that MERS 
is a mere nominee—an entity appointed by the true owner simply for the 
purpose of holding property in order to facilitate transactions.92  Recent 
court opinions stress that this defect is not just a procedural one but is also 
a substantive failure, one that is fatal to the plaintiff’s ability to foreclose.93  
Sheila Bair, former Chairperson of the FDIC, testified before a Senate 
Committee opining that flawed banking processes, including faulty 
transfers of loan documents, “have potentially infected millions of 
foreclosures, and the damages to be assessed against these operations could 
be significant and take years to materialize.”94  Bank-friendly legislators 
and attorneys generally would have the public believe that the entire 
economic recovery is tied to the public’s willingness to look the other way. 
MERS was set up without considering how it would destroy or 
seriously dilute accurate and recorded chain of title records in event of 
mass foreclosure.  Already, chains of title have been lost in the frenzy of 
trading and packaging these mortgages into mortgage-backed securities. 
Today, MERS servicers and related foreclosure mills are literally breaking 
a centuries-old custom that protected property rights by requiring every 
sale of property to be publically recorded (pursuant to race/notice statutes) 
and requiring that any creditor claiming a right to foreclose demonstrate 
clear title (with an endorsed note in the creditor’s name and a record at the 
county office showing transfer of the property).  Subsequently, many 
90. See U.S. Bank National Ass’n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40, 44 (Mass. 2011); In re Agard, 444
B.R. 231, 254 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2011). 
91. Ellen Brown, Homeowners’ Rebellion: Could 62 Million Homes Be Foreclosure-Proof?, YES!
MAGAZINE (Aug. 18, 2010), http://www.yesmagazine.org/new-economy/homeowners-rebellion-could-
62-million-homes-be-foreclosure-proof. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. 
94. Oversight of Dodd-Frank Implementation: Monitoring Systematic Risk and Promoting
Financial Stability: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. On Banking, House., and Urban Affairs, 112 
Congress 22–23 (2011) (statement of Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation), available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&File 
Store_id=94d50f1a-75eb-4586-b025-76e44870816b. 
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homeowners can no longer search public records to find out who holds 
their mortgage because the record shows MERS as the mortgage holder 
and/or the purchaser of the foreclosed property, even though financial 
entities may act as a trustee to transactions.  Chain of title may become lost 
due to its inability to be traced amongst the hundreds of thousands of 
MERS transactions.  In the event the chain of title is lost (or at least 
diluted), MERS has a negative effect on the mortgaged homes, and each 
adjoining property adjacent to those homes, including those without a 
mortgage.95  MERS is simply not a viable substitute for the four hundred 
year old system of publicly recording deeds pursuant to race/notice statutes 
in county records offices that make the deeds available for anyone to 
reference in determining property rights. 
D. RECENT COURT RULINGS CRITICAL OF MERS
MERS and securitization problems have come to light in several
publicized court cases.  A sampling of these recent cases include: 
1. U.S. Bank National Association v. Ibanez
In January 2011, the Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed a lower
court’s invalidation of two home foreclosures, stating that lenders Wells 
Fargo Bank and U.S. Bank had failed to prove that they owned the 
mortgages.96  Ibanez dealt with loans that had been pooled into mortgage-
backed securities.  The two foreclosures were made in the names of Wells 
Fargo and US Bank; however, neither of the banks had written mortgages.97  
Instead, they were acting as trustees, or financial caretakers, for pools of 
loans made and serviced by other lenders.98  The Massachusetts’ Supreme 
Court stated: 
We agree with the judge that the plaintiffs, who were not the original 
mortgagees, failed to make the required showing that they were the 
holders of the mortgages at the time of foreclosure.  As a result, they 
did not demonstrate that the foreclosure sales were valid to convey title 
to the subject properties, and their requests for a declaration of clear 
title were properly denied.99 
The Court stated that, for plaintiffs to obtain the judicial declaration of 
95. See Section 5 infra. 
96. E. Scott Reckard, Foreclosure Ruling Could Be Setback for Banks, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2011),
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jan/07/business/la-fi-foreclosure-ruling-20110107.  See also Ibanez, 
941 N. E. 2d at 44. 
97. Id. at 96.
98. Reckard, supra note 96. 
99. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40,44 (Mass. 2011) (emphasis added). 
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clear title “they had to prove their authority to foreclose under the power of 
sale and show their compliance with the requirements on which this 
authority rests.”100  Plaintiffs could not provide this proof.101  Plaintiffs 
needed to be assignees of the mortgage at the time of the notice of sale and 
subsequent foreclosure sale in order to exercise the power of sale contained 
in the mortgages.102  Furthermore, the Court held that, like a sale of land 
itself, the assignment of a mortgage is a conveyance of interest in land that 
requires a writing signed by the grantor.103 
As for the remedy in the case, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts 
ruled that the defendants’ foreclosures had to be undone because industry 
securitization practices had violated real estate law governing how 
mortgages could be transferred.104  Massachusetts is one of twenty-seven 
non-judicial foreclosure states.  Although this ruling is only binding in 
Massachusetts, we can expect the other twenty-six states to more closely 
examine their previous lower court rulings. The end result may be an 
individual homeowner that owes the holder of their note the dollar value of 
the mortgage on the property; however, the property itself is no longer 
collateral for the loan. 
Other courts have agreed with the reasoning in Ibanez.  For example: 
It is the general rule that courts have power to vacate a foreclosure sale 
where there has been fraud in the procurement of the foreclosure decree 
or where the sale has been improperly, unfairly or unlawfully 
conducted, or is tainted by fraud, or where there has been such a 
mistake that to allow it to stand would be inequitable to purchaser and 
parties.105 
The Ibanez problem highlights the flaws with the securitization 
process and the MERS system.  Its failure to publically record deed 
transfers and conveyances (along with sloppy paperwork) led these 
mortgage transfers to be deemed invalid. 
2. In re Agard
In the course of the bankruptcy case entitled In re Agard, a creditor
sought relief from an automatic stay to foreclose on a second interest in the 
100. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d at 51 (emphasis added). 
101. Id. at 54.
102. Id. at 55 (citing In re Schwartz, 366 B.R. 265, 269 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2007) (“Acquiring the
mortgage after the entry and foreclosure sale does not satisfy the Massachusetts statute.”). 
103. See Id.
104. Thom Weidlich, Foreclosures May Be Undone by Massachusetts Ruling on Mortgage
Transfers, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 6, 2011), www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2011-01-06. 
105. 6 Angels, Inc. v. Stuart-Wright Mortgage, Inc., 85 Cal. App. 4th 1279, 1286 (2011); see also In
re Agard, 444 B.R. 231, 244 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2011) 
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debtor’s real property.106  MERS, as an intervener, argued that the terms of 
its membership agreement with the original lender and its successors in 
interest, as well as New York state agency laws, gave MERS the authority 
to assign a mortgage.107  MERS argued that it held legal title to mortgages 
for its members/lenders as both “nominee” and “mortgagee of record.”108  
In his highly critical response to MERS’s request that the Court analyze the 
MERS business model, Judge Robert E. Grossman stated: 
The Court recognizes that an adverse ruling regarding MERS’s 
authority to assign mortgages or act on behalf of its members/lenders 
could have a significant impact on MERS and upon the lenders which 
do business with MERS throughout the United States.  . . . This Court 
does not accept the argument that because MERS may be involved with 
50% of all residential mortgages in the country, that is reason enough 
for this Court to turn a blind eye to the fact that this process does not 
comply with the law.109 
The Court rejected MERS arguments that it acted as nominee, 
mortgagee or agent, adding that “in all future cases which involve MERS, 
the moving party must show that it validly holds both the mortgage and the 
underlying note in order to prove standing before this Court.”110 
3. Bevilacqua v. Rodriguez
This Massachusetts Supreme Court case involves the rights of a third
party Bevilacqua, who acquired title to a home in good faith against the 
procedural and legal safeguards surrounding the foreclosure process and 
procedural protections against wrongful foreclosures.111  Bevilacqua 
acquired a home by quit claim deed from U.S. Bank (as trustee and note 
holder) in 2006.112  U.S. Bank initiated foreclosure on the home’s previous 
owner Pablo Rodriguez without receiving an official mortgage assignment 
from MERS.113  Unfortunately, U.S. Bank did not actually have title to the 
property when it transferred the home to Bevilacqua.114  On April 12, 2010, 
Bevilacqua filed a “try title” action in the Massachusetts Land Court to 
compel Rodriguez to try title to the property.115  In his complaint, 
Bevilacqua claimed to reside at the property and hold record title but, 
106. In re Agard, 444 B.R. at 235.
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. at 254.
111. Bevilacqua v. Rodriguez, 955 N.E.2d 884, 918 (Mass. 2011). 
112. Id. at 888.
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. 
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because MERS had not assigned the mortgage to U.S. Bank at the time of 
foreclosure, Bevilacqua alleged that there was a cloud on his title in the 
form of “the possibility of an adverse claim by Rodriguez against 
Bevilacqua’s title to the property.”116  Rodriguez had not been located and 
did not enter an appearance in this case.117 
In 2005, Rodriguez granted a mortgage on the property to MERS, as 
nominee for Finance America, LLC.118  This mortgage was recorded.119  As 
of June 29, 2006, MERS had not assigned this mortgage to U.S. Bank, 
however, on this date, U.S. Bank executed a foreclosure deed referencing 
the mortgage and purporting to transfer the property pursuant to a 
foreclosure sale from U.S. Bank to U.S. Bank “as Trustee under the 
securitization Servicing Agreement dated as of July 1, 2005 . . . .”120  One 
month later, MERS assigned the mortgage to U.S. Bank in a recorded 
assignment.121  A confirmatory foreclosure deed was then granted on 
October 9, 2006, by U.S. Bank to U.S. Bank as trustee under the servicing 
agreement.122  On October 17, 2006, U.S. Bank, as trustee, granted a 
quitclaim deed to Bevilacqua.123 
The issue in this case was whether a person who holds title to property 
by virtue of a recorded deed, but whose title is clouded by a possible 
adverse claim due to deficiencies from a prior foreclosure in his chain of 
tile, has standing to try title.  The Massachusetts Supreme Court, citing 
precedent from U.S. Bank National Association v. Ibanez, wrote that 
“Massachusetts adheres to the familiar rule that one who sells under a 
power of sale must follow strictly its terms so, where a foreclosure sale 
occurs in the absence of authority, there is no valid execution of the power, 
and the sale is wholly void.”124  The Court continued to explain that “[o]ne 
of the terms of the power of sale that must be strictly adhered to is the 
restriction on who is entitled to foreclose.”125 
The Court reasoned that by Bevilacqua “alleging that U.S. Bank was 
not the assignee of the mortgage at the time of the purported foreclosure, 
Bevilacqua is necessarily asserting that the power of sale was not complied 
with, that the purported sale was invalid, and that his grantor’s title was 
116. Rodriguez, 955 N.E.2d, at 888.
117. Id. at 887.
118. Id. at 888.
119. Id. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. at 888.
123. Id. 
124. Id. at 892–93 (quoting U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Ibanez, 458 Mass. 637, 646 (2011), quoting
Moore v. Dick, 72 N.E. 967 (1905)). 
125. Id. 
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defective.”126  The Court then stated that “[i]n light of its defective title, the 
intention of U.S. Bank to transfer the property to Bevilacqua is irrelevant 
and he cannot become owner of the property pursuant to a quit claim 
deed.”127 
The Court held that, although the purchaser was in physical possession 
of the property when he filed the try title action, he lacked standing because 
his chain of title rested on a foreclosure sale conducted by someone other 
than the mortgagee or his successors and that a single deed considered 
without reference to its chain of title was insufficient to show record title as 
required by Massachusetts law.128  Additionally, the Court held that the 
purchaser could not claim record title based on a theory that he was a bona 
fide purchaser for value and without notice and dismissed Bevilacqua’s 
complaint.129 
Bevilacqua contrasts the principles of nemo dat quod non habet (you 
can’t give away what you do not own) and bona fide purchaser (one who 
takes in good faith for value and without notice of defect will get legal 
protection against claims).130  As exemplified in Bevilacqua, nemo dat 
prevails.131 
One commentator summarized the problems associated with 
Bevilacqua as follows: 
The court just said you might be able to go back and re-foreclose (on 
the property) and prove title, but you do not have clear title now . . . . 
The issue for a homeowner has to prove that a foreclosing entity had 
the right to foreclose.  But if I am someone who has bought a 
foreclosure, I now cannot sell my home until I can prove that the 
foreclosing entity had that right of foreclosure, which might be difficult 
for me to prove.132 
126. Rodriguez, 955 N.E.2d, at 888.
127. Id. 
128. Id. at 886.
129. Id. 
130. Adam Levitin, Nemo Dat Trumps Bona Fide Purchaser, Credit Slips (Oct. 2011)
http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2011/10/nemo-dat-trumps-bona-fide -purchaser.html 
131. Id. 
132. Kerri Panchuk, Buyer of Invalid Foreclosure Loses Appeal to Clear Property Title, HOUSING 
WIRE (Oct. 18, 2011). 
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V. HOW MERS HAS BROKEN OR DILUTED CHAIN OF TITLE FOR
BOUNDARY DISPUTES BETWEEN FORECLOSED PROPERTIES
AND ALL OF THEIR NEIGHBORS 
A. MERS HAS BROKEN OR SEVERELY DILUTED CHAIN OF TITLE
In the midst of buying and selling mortgages between banks and
creating mortgage backed securities, MERS was created to shuffle home 
loans quickly between lenders, leaving homeowners unable to find out who 
actually owned their mortgage at any given time.133  In addition to tracking 
ownership and servicing rights, when closing on home mortgages, 
mortgage lenders now often list MERS as the “mortgagee of record” on the 
paper mortgage rather than the real mortgagee.134  The mortgage is then 
recorded with the county property recorder’s office under MERS, Inc.’s 
name rather than under the lender’s name.135  Historically, employees of 
county recording offices kept records of each individual company that 
recorded mortgage loans and mortgage loan assignments, but not today—
today MERS is the only company listed.136  Currently, it is estimated that 
MERS holds over half of all mortgages in the United States—
approximately 60 million mortgages137 
In this process, while MERS holds mortgages as the “mortgagee of 
record” promissory notes are separated and sequentially transferred from 
community bank to larger bank to investment bank to mortgage backed 
security without these transfers between banks ever being publically 
recorded or traceable in the grantor/grantee indexes.138  Sometimes these 
transfers are documented in the MERS system (rather than the county 
property recorder’s office) and sometimes they are never documented at 
all.139  MERS then initiates foreclosure actions on behalf of lenders.140  As 
133. This lack of knowledge often led to payments made to the wrong bank or lender because the
homeowner could not look to publicly recorded deeds to determine the ever changing identity of their 
lender.  Michael Grover, Fed-led Research Reveals Need For Better Twin Cities Foreclosure Data, THE 
FED. RES. BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS (Sept. 2006), http://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications_papers/ 
pub_display.cfm?id=2200. 
134. R.K. Arnold, Yes, There Is Life on MERS, 11-AUG PROB. & PROP. 32, 32–34 (1997).  See also
Christopher L. Peterson, Foreclosure, Subprime Mortgage Lending, and the Mortgage Electronic 
Registration System, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1359 (2010), for a comprehensive explanation of the MERS 
process. 
135. Peterson, supra note 134, at 1361. 
136. Id. at 1362. 
137. Michael Powell & Gretchen Morgenson, MERS? It May Have Swallowed Your Loan, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 6, 2011, at BU1. 
138. See Marian Wang, Backgrounder: A Closer Look at MERS, the Industry’s Controversial
Mortgage Clearinghouse, PROPUBLICA (Mar. 7, 2011), http://www.propublica.org/blog/item/back 
grounder-a-closer-look-at-mers-the-industrys-controversial-mortgage-cle. 
139. Wang, supra note 138. 
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stated above, courts have held that MERS lacks standing to foreclose on a 
particular property, and many times, the actual owner of the property 
cannot even be determined because of falsified (robo-signed), backdated or 
lost/nonexistent records. 
This phenomenon also means that the property’s chain of title is lost 
in public records or severely diluted (because it cannot be traced amongst 
the hundreds of thousands of MERS transactions).  If the chain of title is 
lost for a foreclosed property, any property that shares a common property 
boundary line with that foreclosed property may have also lost its senior 
rights in a boundary dispute.  Boundary disputes between neighbors are 
very common; however, they were historically not well publicized.  This is 
simply because these boundary disputes were previously resolved by 
searching chain of title records and dividing property according to the 
principles listed above.  Now that chain-of-title is destroyed/severely 
diluted, these same boundary disputes will require court intervention to set 
boundary lines.  Additionally, because of clouded titles, both foreclosed 
property owners and their neighbors may not be able to sell their properties 
because buyers will not be able to obtain title insurance (or provide the 
same warranty deed issued by a lender) and consequently, buyers will not 
be able to obtain financing. 
As an example of these principles, see Diagram B on the next two 
pages. 
140. Robbie Whelan, Lawmaker Questions Power to Foreclose, WALL ST. J., (Nov. 1, 2010), http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704865104575588791583567372.html. 
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Diagram B 
MERS Conveyance 
v 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Original Grantor A
A conveys East 50 feet to 
B in 1960.  Conveyance 
recorded and traceable in 
grantor/grantee index. 
A 
Remainder 
(1960) 
B 
East 50 ft. 
(1960) 
A 
Remainder 
(1965) 
C 
East 25 
ft. 
(1965) 
B 
East 50 ft. 
(1960)
A conveys 
East 25 feet 
of his 
remaining 
parcel to C in 
1965.  
Conveyance 
recorded and 
traceable in 
grantor/ 
grantee index. 
A conveys his 
remaining 20 feet to 
D in 1970.  It is 
conveyed as 25 feet 
because A thinks he 
has 25 feet left to 
convey.  
Conveyance is 
recorded as 25 feet 
and is traceable in 
grantor/grantee 
index. 
D 
Remainder 
(1970) 
C 
East 25 ft. 
(1965)
B 
East 50 ft. 
(1960) 
E 
Remainder 
(2008) 
C 
East 25 ft. 
(1965) 
B 
East 50 ft. 
(1960) 
D conveys what he 
thinks is 25 feet to 
E in 2008 (it is 
really 20 feet.)  
Conveyance 
recorded and 
traceable in 
grantor/grantee 
index. 
At this point, if a 
survey reveals that the 
original parcel A 
contained 95 feet, 
normal rules determine 
junior and senior 
rights without the need 
for litigation.  Tracing 
back to grantor A, B 
will get 50 feet (1960),  
C will get 25 feet 
(1965), E will get the 
remaining 20 feet (D 
acquired 20 feet in 
1970 from A.) 
Orignal grantor 
believes he owns 
100 feet but he 
really owns 95 feet. 
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NOW THE PROBLEM STARTS 
MERS Conveyance 
E 
(2008) 
C 
East 25 ft. 
(1965) 
B 
East 50 ft. 
(1960) 
MERS holds 
the mortgage 
as a nominee. 
MERS 
conveys note 
to Bank One.  
Conveyance is 
not recorded 
and is not 
traceable in 
the grantor/ 
grantee index.
Bank One 
conveys note 
to Bank Two.  
Conveyance is 
not recorded 
and is not 
traceable in 
the grantor/ 
grantee index. 
Bank Two 
conveys note 
to Bank Three. 
Conveyance is 
not recorded 
and is not 
traceable in 
the grantor/ 
grantee index. 
In this series of 
conveyances, the mortgage 
and the note are separated.  
Due to the fact that these 
conveyances were not 
recorded and are not 
traceable in the 
grantor/grantee index (in 
combination with lost 
paperwork, back-dated and 
forged documents, and 
robo-signatures) these 
conveyances starting with 
E’s foreclosure by MERS in 
2009 cannot be traced back 
up to E (or earlier) without 
looking at hundreds of 
thousands of MERS 
transactions.  Because of 
post-dating, this search 
cannot be confined to a 
given year.   There is no 
way to trace the property 
back to the original grantor 
A. The chain of title is 
broken/severely diluted and 
a wild deed is created. 
MERS 
2009 
E loses his 
property in 
a 2009 
foreclosure 
done in the 
name of 
MERS. Bank 
One 
Note 
Holder 
Bank 
Two 
Note 
Holder 
Bank 
Three 
Note 
Holder 
Bank Three 
conveys 
property to F in 
2010. 
F 
(2010) 
C 
(1980) 
B 
(1960) 
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Bank three (note holder) conveys the foreclosed property to F in 2010.  
There are several problems with this conveyance: 
First Set of Problems: 
1. Bank Three cannot prove it actually owns title to the property because
the note and the mortgage were separated in 2009 (MERS held the
mortgage and the note was assigned to Bank One, Bank Two, and Bank
Three in a series of transactions and none of the transactions were
recorded.)  This is a wild deed.
a. Because Bank Three cannot prove they own title to the property to
convey to F, F cannot obtain title insurance on the property unless
Bank Three agrees to indemnify F (or provide a warranty deed)
against any title claims or losses as part of F’s title insurance policy.
b. Similarly, F cannot prove that he owns title to the property (clouded
title/wild deed); therefore, F will have a problem selling the property
because:
(1) Realistically, F will not be able to indemnify a prospective
buyer against any title claims or losses (as Bank Three had done
for F);
(2) A prospective buyer will not be able to obtain title insurance
because the property’s title is clouded and the property has a wild
deed.  Without title insurance or a redeemable warranty deed, a
prospective buyer cannot obtain financing (leaving only cash
buyers);
(3) A clouded title/wild deed will diminish the market value of
the property when F tries to sell the property even if he can find a
cash buyer.
Second Set of Problems: 
2. When F purchased the property in 2010, Bank Three believed that it was
conveying twenty-five feet to F.  F also believed that he was purchasing
twenty-five feet.  F had a survey done in 2010 to determine boundaries.  In
conducting the survey, the surveyor found:
a. The original grantor A (traced back from B and C properties) only had
a total of ninety-five feet to convey due to a prior survey discrepancy.
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b. The surveyor must determine the senior rights between F, C, and B
in order to determine who gets what portion of the ninety-five feet
(senior and junior rights); however, this cannot be determined
because:
(1) F thinks he owns twenty-five feet, C thinks he owns twenty-
five feet, and B thinks he owns fifty feet.
(2) The surveyor cannot trace F’s property back to E due to the
MERS transactions, so you cannot determine whose conveyance
came first in time (thus senior by race/notice statutes)—F, B, or C.
(3) Therefore, the surveyor cannot determine who has senior and
who has junior rights between F, B, and C.
c. All three properties (F, B, and C) now have unclear boundary lines
creating a cloud on all three properties’ titles.
(1) F, B, and C will have to disclose the boundary discrepancy
when they attempt to sell their properties.
(2) The boundary discrepancy will create a cloud on title for all
three properties, diminishing the properties’ values.
(3) The cloud on title will make it impossible for prospective
buyers to obtain title insurance (and financing) on any of the three
properties.
d. Because of the broken/diluted chain of title and the boundary
discrepancy, F, B, and C will have to go to court to have their
boundary lines adjudicated (even if they agree to a compromise)
because a surveyor cannot make this determination absent a court
order.  This process is expensive and time consuming, holding up land
sales, disposition of estates and family trust, and negatively affecting
the American economy.
B. A PURCHASER MAY NOT BE ABLE TO OBTAIN TITLE INSURANCE ON A
FORECLOSED PROPERTY PROCESSED THROUGH MERS
Title insurance “involves the issuance of an insurance policy 
promising that, if the state of the title is other than as represented on the 
face of the policy, and if the insured suffers loss as a result of the 
difference, the insurer will reimburse the insured for that loss and any 
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related legal expenses, up to the face amount of the policy.”141  When a title 
insurance policy represents that a title search was made, it impliedly 
represents that the defects, impediments and other matters mentioned in the 
policy and excluded from coverage are the only ones disclosed by a search 
of public records (or disclosed on a new proper survey commissioned at the 
time the policy is issued).  To the average person who has paid for a title 
search made in connection with a policy of title insurance, the policy itself 
serves as the abstract of title.142  The GAO 07-401 reported on the nefarious 
loss and loss adjustment claims of title insurance premiums.143  The concept 
of title insurance is largely not understood by the average homeowner. 
Title insurers pay few claims (usually high dollars) with only five percent 
of the premiums paid as losses/ loss adjustments (2005).144 
MERS has broken or severely diluted the chain of title for foreclosed 
properties (see Diagram B above) and their neighbors (with sequential 
conveyances and a boundary discrepancy).  Consequently, all of these 
homeowners will have clouded titles.  With clouded titles, subsequent 
purchasers of any of these properties (foreclosure or neighbor with 
sequential conveyance and boundary discrepancy) will not be able to obtain 
title insurance without specific exemptions, and in turn, they will also not 
be able to obtain financing, leaving only investment purchasers able to pick 
up properties for cash at a discounted price.  These same investors may not 
be able to resell these properties—except to other investors.  In fact, many 
pundits have attempted to tie unemployment and economic recovery 
directly to the housing crisis while portraying homeowners as irresponsible 
for failing to pay their mortgages.  What they have failed to acknowledge is 
that, at the end of the day, the United States has a glut of houses available 
to very few legitimately qualified buyers.  Gone are the days of income 
stated loans, $0 down payments and giving mortgages to anyone with a 
pulse.  Letting lenders and MERS off the hook without liability after their 
own strategic defaults and mortgage swaps for pennies on the dollar will 
not increase the number of qualified buyers.  The real question is, who will 
buy these title-defective houses now? 
The inventory of foreclosed properties is being off-loaded to cash 
paying investors.  Many of these investors pay cash allowing them to act 
quickly without lender involvement.  Lenders typically require title 
insurance as a condition of a real property loan.  Investors, paying cash to 
141. Lick Mill Creek Apartments v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 283 Cal. Rptr. 231, 233 (Ct. App. 1991).
See also CAL. INS. CODE § 12340.1 (West 2011). 
142. Banville v. Schmidt, 112 Cal. Rptr. 126, 131–36 (Ct. App. 1974). 
143. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-401, TITLE INSURANCE: ACTIONS NEEDED TO 
IMPROVE OVERSIGHT OF THE TITLE INDUSTRY AND BETTER PROTECT CONSUMERS, 41–42 (2007). 
144. Id. 
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purchase properties, may forego title insurance.  Although these investors 
are presumed to be bona fide purchasers, they may not hold clear and 
marketable title or title insurance on the property they purchased.  In fact, 
they may have to litigate.145  In actuality, this resourceful cash buyer may 
be stuck with the property purchased.  When the investor attempts to resell 
the property to a subsequent purchaser, they will have a problem.  In this 
scenario, a prudent lender will require additional title insurance 
endorsements as protection against clouded title issues.  Title companies 
will not offer these endorsements and, when the subsequent purchaser’s 
loan falls apart, the investor will be stuck with the property unless he/she 
can find another cash buyer or file an expensive and lengthy quiet title 
action.  Also, if the investor attempts to sell the property, he/she faces 
liability including, but not limited to, contract rescission due to state 
disclosure statutes.146  Time will prove that the purchase of many 
foreclosures (at any price) was a foolish investment.  Purchasers should be 
asking “How good is the warranty (on a warranty deed) issued by a limited 
liability company liquidating an inventory of housing?”  See Section VII 
below regarding consumer protection tips regarding purchasing 
foreclosures. 
We have already started to see this MERS problem in the context of 
title insurance become a reality.  According to Bloomberg October 20, 
2010 “Fidelity National To Require Banks To Sign Foreclosure Warranty,” 
because of the problems with MERS, in order for an individual buyer to 
obtain title insurance on a foreclosed home purchased from a bank, banks 
were required to provide a written indemnity to the title insurer and buyer 
stating that the bank actually owns the property and would defend against 
any subsequent claims on title.147  At one point in October 2010, Old 
Republic was reportedly refusing to write title policies for some 
foreclosures all together148 (although this policy was subsequently changed 
and the indemnification requirement was relaxed).149  Why?  Because if one 
145. See Bevilacqua v. Rodriguez, 955 N.E.2d 884 (Mass. 2011). 
146. See Scotch Bonnett Realty Corp. v. Matthews, 417 Md. 570 (2011) (analyzing the differences
between a forged deed and a deed obtained by false pretenses in Maryland; a deed obtained through 
fraud, deceit or trickery is voidable as between the parties thereto, but not as to a bona fide purchaser.  
A forged deed on the other hand, is void ab initio). 
147. Danielle Kucera, Fidelity National To Require Banks To Sign Foreclosure Warranty,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 20, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-20/fidelity-national-to-
require-banks-to-sign-warranty-for-foreclosure-sales.html. 
148. Stephanie Armour, Old Republic To Stop Writing Policies For Some Foreclosures, USA
TODAY (Oct. 2, 2010), http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/housing/2010-10-02-old-republic-
foreclosures_N.htm. 
149. Danielle Kucera, Fidelity National Drops Plan For Lender Foreclosure Guarantee,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 27, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-27/fidelity-national-drops-
plan-for-lender-foreclosure-guarantee.html. 
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of the four major title companies required indemnity or refused to insure 
foreclosures altogether, this would be the demise of the title industry.  The 
problems with boundary disputes will soon follow. 
The only thing holding the title companies together is a piece of duct 
tape and a stick of gum.  Currently, title companies are being hit with large 
claims due to the loss of priority of liens and loans (another form of junior 
and senior rights). 
As shown in Diagram B above: 
 A bank cannot prove that it actually owns the foreclosed property
because the note and the mortgage are separated creating a wild
deed. 
 As a result, a first subsequent buyer of the foreclosed property may
not be able to obtain title insurance unless the bank agrees to
indemnify this first subsequent buyer against any title claims or 
losses as part of the first subsequent buyer’s title insurance policy. 
 Even if the bank and the title insurer work together to provide title
insurance to this first subsequent buyer for the foreclosed
property, when this first subsequent buyer goes to re-sell the 
foreclosed property to a second subsequent buyer, the first 
subsequent buyer will have a clouded title and wild deed and the 
second subsequent buyer will not be able to obtain title insurance 
and financing without indemnity from the first subsequent buyer 
(which in all likelihood this buyer cannot provide). 
 If there is a boundary dispute and land shortage as a result of
sequential conveyances between the first subsequent buyer and
his/her neighbors and the parties cannot trace the conveyances 
back to the original grantor to determine junior and senior rights 
because MERS has destroyed or severely diluted chain of title 
records, this first subsequent buyer’s neighbors will also have 
unclear boundaries, clouded titles that must be disclosed and these 
neighbors will not be able to sell their properties to buyers 
requiring title insurance to obtain financing. 
 This first subsequent buyer’s property and all of this party’s
neighbors’ properties will be diminished in value because of the
clouded titles on their properties. 
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C. THE TORRENS SYSTEM—AN ALTERNATIVE?
The only known alternative to the chain of title system is the Torrens
system which registers the owner, not the land.150  Minnesota and 
Massachusetts (via the Massachusetts Land Court system) have established 
Torrens systems, as well as cities such as Chicago and San Francisco, 
where fire destroyed the land title records.151 
To institute a Torrens system, you must have a court finding that 
eliminates the necessity for a chain of title and a declaration of the property 
location.152  Under the Torrens system, the owner’s certificate of title 
defeats any competing claims not declared at the initial proceedings.153  
Furthermore, a Torrens system would require a survey and court costs for 
each individual property.  Conceivably, if done properly, a Torrens system 
would take hundreds of years to create—not exactly a feasible solution. 
Additionally, once established, each state must guarantee rights of 
ownership and establish a fund to pay the costs for errors in court 
determined ownership.  Although a Torrens system would, in essence, 
eliminate the need for title insurance, it would be too expensive and take 
too long to implement.  As it stands, there is simply no reasonable 
alternative to maintaining our chain of title system—a system that MERS 
has frustrated. 
VI. CONCLUSION
Recently, there have been calls to create a national system/standard for 
originating, selling and servicing mortgage loans.154  The MERS system is 
an example of a flawed national system that did not take into account the 
fact that each state determines its own real property laws and recording 
system.  A nationalized system simply will not work.  Land ownership is 
local.  Each state has its own laws governing the real property and the laws 
applicable to one state cannot work in another state. 
Kurt Pfotenhauer, chief executive of the American Land Title 
Association, said MERS is an “elegant solution” to the inefficiencies of 
150. CURTIS M. BROWN, WALTER G. ROBILLARD & DONALD A. WILSON, BROWN’S BOUNDARY
CONTROL AND LEGAL PRINCIPLES, 52–53 (6th ed. 2009). 
151. Id. at 53.
152. Id. 
153. Id. 
154. Christopher Whalen, The Ibanez Decision: What It Means For Homeowners and Investors, 
REUTERS (Jan. 10, 2011) (referencing An Open Letter To U.S. Regulators Regarding National Loan 
Servicing Standards (Dec. 21, 2010)), http://blogs.reuters.com/christopher-whalen/2011/01/10/the-
ibanez-decision-what-it-means-for-home-owners-and-investors. 
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paperwork.155  Although he would welcome more regulatory oversight, 
Pfotenhauer said title companies have found the database to be accurate 
and that its main flaw is that it doesn’t contain every mortgage in America.  
This is a remarkable statement from a title insurance industry 
representative.  The idea may be to apply the golden rule—he with all the 
gold rules.  If MERS controlled all mortgages, maybe MERS would be 
deemed too big to fail (like AIG).  However, land title is not about 
securities.  It just so happened that mortgage backed securities were formed 
as a market gamble.  Investors may have gambled and lost, however, 
MERS cannot be allowed to ruin land title as a result of this securitization. 
MERS, a shell company with forty-five employees and 20,000 Vice 
Presidents (paying $25.00 each for the right to use the MERS name), may 
destroy our land title records affecting all American homeowners (not just 
those unfortunate enough to face foreclosure) if appropriate actions are not 
taken.  Chain of title destruction boils down to the destruction of a basic 
American right—land ownership with a verifiable clear title. If states are 
forced to accept a new system, Americans will lose the legal theories that 
establish and protect real property rights including marketable title, 
prescriptive rights, acquiescence, equitable estoppels, adverse possession 
and others.  Think about the following: 
 Do we really want to force Americans to litigate their property
rights that were documented and maintained for nearly 400 years
until the introduction of MERS? 
 If these conclusions are incorrect, why did the title insurance
industry threaten to refuse to insure foreclosures in October
2010?156 
 What is the indemnity relationship between lenders and title insurers
today (keeping in  mind land title insurance covered risk usually
includes fraud or forgery in the execution of documents in the 
155. Ariana Eunjung Cha, Steven Mufson, How The Mortgage Clearinghouse MERS Became A
Villain In the Foreclosure Mess, WASHINGTON POST (Dec. 30, 2010), http://www.washington 
post.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/30/AR2010123003056.html. 
156. David Streitfeld, Company Stops Insuring Title In Chase Foreclosures, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2,
2010).  In April  2011, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that MERS was ineligible to use Michigan’s 
nonjudicial foreclosure process because MERS did not meet foreclosure by advertisement requirements 
and MERS should have filed the foreclosures through Michigan’s judicial foreclosure process.  Austin 
Kilgore, MERS Ruling Forces HUD to Reforeclose on Mich. REO, National Mortgage News (May 27, 
2011).  Most major title insurance company underwriters had ceased issuing title insurance to any 
properties where MERS closed by advertisement. Consequently, Michigan REO properties in HUD’s 
inventory that cannot close due to the inability to obtain title insurance, must be re-foreclosed. Id. 
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chain of title (deeds, mortgages, mortgage satisfaction pieces, 
etc.)?157 
On October 13, 2010, the American Land Title Association (ALTA) 
indicated that title insurers are looking to lenders to provide appropriate 
indemnities.158  In fact: 
ALTA drafted a model indemnity agreement with Fannie and 
Freddie that acknowledged the insurer’s obligation to defend its 
policyholders in the event of a court challenge to the property’s title, 
and required the servicer to reimburse the title insurer for any cost of 
defending the title of the purchaser of an REO property.159 
Title insurers are aware of the problems and are presumably paying claims 
for loss of priority (subordination). 
Fast forward, first time buyers purchase their first home with the 
“title insurance indemnification from lenders” policy.  The title is not 
repaired, there may or may not be bona fide purchaser rights which may or 
may not be trumped by nemo dat theories.  The first time buyers offer to 
sell the home; can they indemnify the title insurance company for the 
subsequent purchaser? 
VII. CONSUMER PROTECTION TIPS
Although foreclosed properties may appear to be a “bargain,” no 
American (from the sophisticated investor to the layperson buying a home 
for their family to reside) should purchase a foreclosed property owned by 
a bank or servicer without first taking the following actions with the advice, 
counsel and assistance of a licensed attorney in your state well versed in 
real property laws and litigation, boundary disputes, title insurance, 
financing and contract law: 
1. Do not pay cash for a foreclosure, even if you have cash available.
2. Do not rely on the “warranty” provided by an LLC or an individual
seller unless they provide indemnity in the form of collateral or a security 
interest separate from the deed and of value equal to or greater than the 
purchase price of the subject property. 
3. Obtain an “Owner’s Policy” from a reputable title insurer in
addition to and separate from a “Lender’s Policy.”160  The Owner’s Policy 
157. House Financial Services Subcommittee on Housing and Community Opportunity, Testimony
of Anne Anastasi (President of the American Land Title Association) on Behalf of the Amercian Land 
Title Association, Robo-Signing, Chain of Title, Loss Mitigation, and Other Issues in Mortgage 
Servicing (Nov. 18, 2010). 
158. Id. at 13.
159. Id. 
160. Lenders routinely negotiate “ALTA Endorsements” to title policies.  Title insurers want this
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should contain specific endorsements and should protect the buyer against 
liens on the subject property.  Consult a knowledgeable attorney for the 
requisite language and endorsements that must be contained in the Owner’s 
Policy. 
4. Do not buy a foreclosure with a sequential conveyance without
obtaining a chain of title on the property to be purchased (and on all 
adjacent parcels as these may have also been prior foreclosures).  If the 
chain of title cannot be made available, there may be a problem.161 
5. Retain a qualified attorney to render a written opinion as to the
status of title to the foreclosed property, title insurance coverage and any 
exceptions to title insurance coverage. 
6. Verify that the attorney you retain has proper errors and omissions
(malpractice) insurance coverage that exceeds the value of the property you 
are considering purchasing. 
7. As an innocent purchaser, know the difference between a deed
obtained by fraud and a deed that has been forged.  If a deed is forged, it 
cannot pass good title.  If a deed is procured by fraud, then it can pass good 
title to a bona fide purchaser without notice.162  However, to realize the 
property rights may require expensive litigation and a quiet title action may 
have a period of time (oftentimes years) to take effect. 
The bottom line is that if two properties have equal appeal and all 
other factors being equal between purchasing a foreclosure versus a non-
foreclosure, it may be preferable to purchase a non-foreclosure unless you 
are willing to perform the necessary and substantial due diligence on the 
foreclosed property with the assistance of a qualified attorney. 
VIII. EPILOGUE
Prior to this article’s publication, several events occurred, including: 
1. An audit by San Francisco county officials of approximately four
hundred recent foreclosures revealed almost all had either legal violations 
or suspicious documentation—eighty-four percent of the files contained 
apparent clear violations of law and two-thirds had at least four violations 
or irregularities.163  This audit examined files between January 2009 to 
additional insurance to protect their investment from adverse title claims.  Oftentimes, title insurers will 
spend thousands of dollars on due diligence before lending on large real property loans. 
161. Bevilacqua v. Rodriguez, 955 N.E.2d 884, 918 (Mass. 2011).  Nemo dat trumps bona fide
purchaser rights.  Adam Levitin, Nemo Dat Trumps Bona Fide Purchaser, Credit Slips (Oct. 2011), 
http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2011/10/nemo-dat-trumps-bona-fide -purchaser.html 
162. See Scotch Bonnett Reealty Corp. v. Matthews, 417 Md. 50, 570 (Bankr. D. Md. 2011). 
163. Gretchen Morgenson, Audit Uncovers Extensive Flaws in Foreclosures, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2012). 
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November 2011.164 
Banks involved in buying and selling foreclosed properties appear to be 
aware of potential problems if gaps in the chain of title cloud a 
subsequent buyer’s ownership of the home.  Lou Pizante, a partner at 
Aequitas who worked on the audit, pointed to documents that banks 
now require buyers to sign holding the institution harmless if questions 
arise about the validity of the foreclosure sale.165 
Subsequently, Democratic Leader Nancy Pelosi and Congresswoman 
Jackie Speier sent a letter to Attorney General Eric Holder asking him to 
involve the Justice Department’s Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force 
to examine whether any violations of Federal law occurred in San 
Francisco.166 
Furthermore, the MERS servicer identification system often does not 
produce any information on the beneficial ownership of loans.167  Instead, it 
states: “Investor: This investor has chosen not to display their information. 
For assistance, please contact the servicer.”168  Does this ambiguous 
sentence mean (1) MERS does not know who owns the loan (meaning that 
we no longer have a record keeping system to track legally recognized 
ownership interests in land back to a root of title) or (2) the owner of the 
loan actually refused to be identified (meaning that the MERS system has 
abated an important legal incentive to provide public notice of land 
ownership interests)?169 
2. New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman filed a civil suit
against various units of JP Morgan Chase, Bank of America, Wells Fargo, 
MERSCORP and MERS over the use of MERS in foreclosures.170  The suit 
alleges that the creation and use of MERS has resulted in a wide range of 
deceptive and fraudulent foreclosure filings in New York State and the 
federal courts, including the use of robo-signers who failed to review the 
underlying records as required and served to disguise gaps in chain of 
164. Morgenson, supra note 163 
165. Id. 
166. Press Release, Pelosi, Speier Request Justice Department Examination into Possible Violations
of Federal Law in San Francisco Foreclosures (Feb. 17, 2012), http://www.democraticleader.gov/ 
news/press?id=2496 
167. United States House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, written Testimony of
Christopher L. Peterson, Foreclosed Justice: Causes and Effects of the Foreclosure Crisis (Dec. 2, 
2010). 
168. Id. 
169. Id. (also stating “We must recognize that our heritage of legal certainty in property rights
created by the interaction of public recording systems and land title statutes is an important national 
economic resource that has been depleted by the MERS system”). 
170. Yves Smith, Schneiderman Files Civil Fraud Lawsuit Against Three Major Banks for Use of
MERS, Naked Capitalism (Feb. 23, 2012).  See also Press Release:  A.G. Schneiderman Announces 
Major Lawsuit Against Nation’s Largest Banks For Deceptive & Fraudulent Use of Electronic 
Mortgage Registry (Feb. 3, 2012) http://www.ag.ny.gov/media center/2012/feb/feb03a 12.html. 
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title.171  The complaint alleges that the practices outlined harmed 
homeowners and undermined the integrity of the judicial foreclosure 
process.172  The lawsuit alleges that employees and agents of various 
financial institutions named, acting as “MERS certifying officers” have 
repeatedly submitted court documents containing false and misleading 
information that made it appear that the foreclosing bank had authority to 
do so when it actually did not have this authority.173 
 This lawsuit further alleges that MERS has effectively eliminated 
homeowner’s and the public’s ability to track property transfers through the 
traditional public records system and asserts that this information is now 
stored only in a private database plagued with inaccuracies and errors over 
which MERS and its financial institution members have sole control.174 
3. After lengthy negotiations and prior opting out by many state
attorneys’ general, it appears that lenders and the attorneys’ general will 
come to an agreement for partial settlement on foreclosure practices in the 
amount of $26 billion.175  The settlement had been previously held up by 
concerns of New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman that the terms 
provided too broad of a release for banks for past misdeeds and would 
make future investigations difficult; however, Schneiderman was able to 
win concessions on this point.176  Releases are expected to be limited to the 
foreclosure process and prosecutors and regulators will still have the right 
to investigate other possible violations such as the assembly of risky 
mortgages into securities that were sold to investors and then went bad 
along with insurance and tax fraud.177  Officials will be able to pursue any 
allegations of criminal activity.178  Furthermore, Schneiderman’s lawsuit 
against MERS will be allowed to go forward.179  Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac (who combined own about half of U.S. mortgages) will not be covered 
by any Attorney General settlement.180 
171. Smith, supra note 178.  See also Complaint filed in Supreme Court of the State of New York,
Kings County entitled The People of the State of New York, by Eric T. Schneiderman v. JP Morgan 
Chase Bank N.A, et al.  (Feb. 3, 2012). 
172. Id. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. 
175. Dawn Kopecki and David McLaughlin, Foreclosure Accord Said to Ensure Same Terms for
All 50 States, BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 14, 2012) http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-02 
14/foreclosure- accord-said-to- ensure-terms-for-all-50-states.html; See also Nelson D. Schwartz and 
Shaila Dewan, States Negotiate $26 Billion Agreement for Homeowners, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2012), 
http://nytimes.com/2012/02/09/business/states-negotiate-25-billion-deal-forhomeowners.html? 
pagewanted=all. 
176. Schwartz and Dewan, supra note 175. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. 
179. Id. 
180. Schwartz and Dewan, supra note 175. 
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 By allowing Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae to purchase 
MERS-recorded loans, the federal government has inadvertently 
undermined sensible state consumer protection and land title 
laws/records.181  MERS now faces uncertain legal costs and, going forward, 
Congress should bar Government Sponsored Enterprises (“GSEs”) from 
becoming more deeply involved with MERS.182  Furthermore, Congress 
should not intervene in state’s property laws with a MERS “whitewash” 
bill over the basic legal problems associated with MERS, as such a bill is 
likely to have unforeseeable and unintended consequences on state laws.183 
181. United States House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, written Testimony of
Christopher L. Peterson, Foreclosed Justice: Causes and Effects of the Foreclosure Crisis (Dec. 2, 
2010). 
182. Id. 
183. Id. 
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